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ABSTRACT
Economic research on post 9-11 terrorism lacks a distinction between fear-based reactions and
rational financial market behavior in its analysis surrounding terror strikes. The purpose of this
paper is to expose and interpret the fear triggered by terrorism in financial markets, and to
separate rational market responses from irrational, fear-driven investor reactions. A rational
market response follows the efficient market theory (Wang 1993) in which investors alter their
behavior based on changes in fundamental values. Becker and Rubinstein (2011) define terrortriggered fear as the magnitude with which subjective beliefs about danger hinder objective risk
assessment. I apply this definition to the De Long et al (1990) discussion of noise trading to
define irrational investor reactions as a response to subjective beliefs about danger and disregard
for fundamental risk that causes volatility and a divergence from fundamental valuations. I
observe the Volatility Index (VIX) and change in 10-year Treasury yield surrounding terror
events to identify irrationality, and differentiate from rational market behavior through a
comparison to the two gauges surrounding foreign and domestic central bank action. I analyze
market behavior surrounding 9-11 and recent 2013 and 2015 terror events and find consistently
heightened post-event volatility. I observe responses in the 10-year Treasury yield, and find that
response duration is dependent on the implications for Federal Reserve policy and expectations
of demand for safe-haven assets (Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen 2012). I also find a
decrease in magnitude of financial market response from 2001 to 2015, which could be due to
prior experience with terrorism (Becker & Rubinstein 2011) or the Federal Reserve’s recent
consideration of global instability in domestic monetary policy.
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1. Introduction
Several years ago I came across an article written from the perspective of a Wall Street
trader as he recounted his experience on September 11th. Most accounts of the event serve as
chilling reminders of terror and loss; however, this unique report offered the opportunity to
understand a trader’s response to tragedy. As he reviewed his thoughts from the day, he was
alarmed to have realized that the first thing on his mind was not his family or his colleagues and
friends in surrounding buildings, but on the market’s response. While the individuals evacuating
beside him were processing the news and calling their wives, he was internally projecting the
effect of the terror on the spot rate of gold futures.
Market speculation had replaced grief and emotion as this trader’s first instinct to this
traumatic event. He knew that investors would react by pouring money into safe haven assets
while the stock market plummeted; he was quantifying investor fear.
The purpose of this paper is to expose and interpret the fear triggered by terrorism in
financial markets, and to separate rational market responses from irrational, fear-driven investor
reactions. In the wake of 9-11, many economists have focused on the immediate economic and
sector specific equity responses to the terror event (Chen et al 2008, Obi 2007). Lenain, Bonturi,
and Koen (2007) attempt instead to observe the long-lasting macroeconomic effects of the
subsequent increase of risk-aversion through an observation of insurance coverage, changes in
trading costs, and increases in security spending, and conclude that unless a new large-scale
threat emerges, these effects are tangible but limited. Many look at the magnitude of reactions by
closely related stock prices, and have concluded that although fundamentals remained strong for
each, airline and insurance sectors suffered significantly following the attack, indicating
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contagion and panic-selling in response to the tragedy (Chen et al 2008). Obi (2007) closely
observes stock market behavior surrounding the event, concluding that pre-event volatility is
suggestive of trading on knowledge of an impending market shock. Evidence exists of a lasting
post-event increase in risk premium by market participants (Obi 2007), a permanent retreat to
safety indicative of a widely inexperienced investor base with terror shocks (Becker &
Rubinstein 2011).
Economic research on post 9-11 terrorism lacks a distinction between fear-based
reactions and rational financial market behavior in its analysis surrounding terror strikes. In their
observation of the effects of terrorism on the use of terror-targeted services, Becker and
Rubinstein (2011) define terror-triggered fear as the magnitude with which subjective beliefs
about danger hinder objective risk assessment. As applied to my thesis, this definition (Becker
and Rubinstein 2011) can be broken down as follows. First, an individual’s “subjective belief”
describes one’s inflated conviction in the likelihood of personal affliction. “Danger” in Becker
and Rubenstein refers to the actual threat of being a victim of terror, and here will be as well,
with the extension to financial market uncertainty. The hindering of “objective risk” describes
the restriction of an ability to employ an unbiased assessment of fundamental riskiness. And
finally, “magnitude” can be equated to the severity of the post-event response, measured through
the volatility and fixed income gauges detailed below.
A specific discussion of the definition of “risk” is also necessary. Gigerenzer (2006)
describes “dread risk” as a low-probability, high-damage event in which many people are killed
at one point of time, causing direct damage at the time of the event, and indirect damage through
its lasting effects on citizens. Similar to the effect noted by Becker and Rubinstein (2011),
Gigerenzer details “avoidance-behavior” in which citizens irrationally alter their behavior by
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avoiding the terror-targeted activity. Girgerenzer finds that this behavior, not only unproductive,
is sometimes harmful in the inappropriate alternatives that individuals engage in to avoid such
risk. Michel-Kerjan (2008) focuses on methodology in measuring the perceived risk of terrorism.
He points to the misconception that risks are mainly local, routine, and predictable through past
experience, which he counters through a discussion almost identical to Girgerenzer’s of dread
risk (2006). Michel-Kerjan (2008) finds that current catastrophe risk calculus is unreliable in
evaluating terror risk due to the uniquely unpredictable nature of terrorism. The inability to
accurately quantify risk of terror has led to observable panic in the market following a terrorist
attack. I define perceived risk as financial market volatility in the wake of a terror event. The
timeline of the surrounding volatility suggests the extent of the market’s anticipation, indicating
the accuracy of investor risk perception. If a risk is accurately priced-in to the market, volatility
occurs prior to the event’s fruition. If a risk is unforeseen, markets respond with higher levels of
volatility following the event as investor fear leads to a bout of panic selling (Bernanke &
Kuttner 2005). The extent of this investor fear, captured through market volatility (Durand, Lim,
& Zumwalt 2011), will be evident through its magnitude and duration.
I differ from Rubinstein and Becker (2011) in the mode of my assignment and
observation of fear. Instead of the use of goods and services affected by terrorism, I will observe
financial market reactions through volatility in the stock market with the widely referenced
“investor fear gauge” Volatility Index (VIX) (Durand et al 2011). I will observe the validity of
the market’s response through the 10-year Treasury bond’s change in yield surrounding the
event. Following a release of new information, the duration of the 10-year Treasury’s response
indicates if the information has altered economic fundamentals (Fleming & Remolona 1999).
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Taken in aggregate, these two indicators create a quantifiable measure of “magnitude” as
referenced in Rubinstein and Becker’s (2011) definition of fear above.
De Long et al (1990) identify “noise traders” as irrational market participants that
respond to “noise” in the market and disregard fundamentals in risk assessment, causing
significant price divergence from fundamental values. Brown (1999) interprets the noisy signal
to be any event causing an undue shift in investor sentiment, causing systematic risk and
increasing volatility. Because noise-trader theory describes cohesive action in response to a noisy
signal (Brown 1999, De Long et al 1990), I interpret the aggregate reaction to a noisy signal as a
fearful response to a market shock. Paired with Becker and Rubinstein’s (2011) definition of
terror-triggered fear, this depicts the irrational, fear-driven market illustrated in depth in Section
5. Reacting to subjective beliefs about danger and disregarding fundamental risk, the irrational
investor responds in fear to a terror threat, observable through relatively high VIX readings and a
concurrent lack of fundamental economic change. The market considers United States Treasuries
to be virtually riskless (Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen 2012), so it follows naturally that
10-year yields respond to terror through an observed tightening as uncertainty mounts and
investors flee to safety.
In order to first present examples of rational market behavior, I will observe policy
actions and economic data releases out of both the United States and other relevant foreign
ministries. Consistent with efficient market theory (Wang 1993), markets operate rationally
while appropriately adjusting investment strategy based on expectations of security
fundamentals. Economic data releases and central bank behavior alter expectations of the federal
funds target interest rate, which alters the market discount rate, a determinant in financial
security valuation via the capital asset pricing model (Litzenberger & Tuttle 1972). Thus, I am
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able to illustrate rational market activity through observation of the VIX and movements in 10year yields surrounding economic data releases and central bank activity. Scheduled
announcements regarding the state of the economy, FOMC statement releases, or any indication
of future changes to monetary policy will observe a pre-event surge in VIX, indicative of
investor speculation (Obi 2007). Post-event volatility declines, as the opportunity for speculation
has concluded (Bernanke & Kuttner 2005). Foreign central banks do not all have the same
responsibility of transparency as the Federal Reserve, making their activity harder for U.S.
investors to predict relative to the Fed, observable through large swings in VIX following
surprise announcements (Kausik & Koo 2001). Foreign central bank action is significant to the
Federal Reserve’s policy decisions because global monetary policy changes the value of the
domestic financial securities. In turn, relative attractiveness of U.S. securities is altered.
Once I establish instances of rational market behavior, I evaluate the effect of the
market’s risk environment surrounding terror events. Based on the exponential increase to the
threat of terrorism since 9-11, investors have gained meaningful exposure to terrorism. Becker
and Rubinstein (2011) observe that following a terror attack on public transportation, occasional
riders almost entirely stop their use of the service, despite the risk of an additional attack being
negligible. Frequent users observe less of a decline in use. Over a period of increasing terror
threats, riders reestablish their former frequency of public transportation use. Becker and
Rubinstein conclude that additional exposure teaches market participants to combat their fear of
terror that initially hindered objective risk assessment. Similarly, my observations expose
irrational financial market behavior as an initial response to terrorism that, after a rapid increase
in reports of global terror instances (START 2013), observes a reduction in duration as investors
learn to respond appropriately. I first outline the initial shock to the US financial marketplace
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after 9-11, and then observe how markets have adapted in the more recent attacks of 2013 and
2015.
I narrow my remaining analysis to the years 2013 and 2015 for two specific reasons.
First, each was host to a largely publicized act of terror on a first-world country (Brinkley 2013,
Brisard 2015). The Boston Marathon bombing in April of 2013 and the coordinated strikes on
Paris in November of 2015 shattered the developed world’s perceptions of security, and will
provide an interesting comparison as the threat of terror continues to grow. Second, 2013 and
2015 observed very different volatility trends. In 2013, the maximum VIX reading barely
scraped over 20, while in 2015 it reached levels above 50. In selecting these very different years,
I will analyze the significance of investor risk aversion prior to each event in determining the
magnitude of reaction to a market shock (Durand et al 2011).

2. Methodology
I will illustrate fear in the market through the intraday VIX maximum reading and then,
observing the 10-year Treasury’s activity, determine how long the market took to correct back to
pre-shock levels. My purpose in selecting these two indicators is to express both the short-term
and long-term responses to each market shock. An event that corresponds to a spike in VIX will
indicate the panic in the market (Kausik & Koo 2001), while the reaction time in the yield on the
10-year Treasury will signify the validity of the initial panic. If the 10-year corrects back to
previous levels quickly, this indicates that the market has discounted the event as insignificant,
acknowledging an overreaction (Fleming & Remolona 1999, Bernanke & Kuttner 2005).
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The VIX is comprised of a weighted measure of the implied volatility of a wide range of

S&P 500 call and put options on the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE), and is widely
referred to as the “investor fear gauge” by market speculators (Durand et al 2011). Durand et al
(2011) refer to a reading of 20 or higher as representative of a highly uncertain and risk-averse
market, and a number below 20 as indicative of more bullish investor pool. In terms of its actual
mathematical derivation, the CBOE offers this formula on their website:

Source: Chicago Board of Options Exchange (March 2016)

More simply put, the VIX represents any +/- percentage point movement by the S&P 500 index,
annualized for one standard deviation (Deuker 1997). For example, when the VIX is at 20, the
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S&P is expected to stay within a +/- 20% range over one year 68% of the time (or within the first
standard deviation). It then becomes obvious why high VIX levels are representative of
volatility—an increase in VIX signifies an increase in future uncertainty.
Coupling this indicator with the 10-year Treasury yield allows for a complete
understanding of the market’s reception of a shock, as well as the preceding risk environment
(Fleming & Remolona 1999; Kausik & Koo 2001). According to historical data from the FOMC,
the 10-year Treasury saw average daily moves of 4 basis points (“bps” here on) in both 2013 and
2015, but 2013 reached wider a wider maximum shift of 21 bps, while 2015’s intraday ceiling
was +/- 16 bps. Over the year, 2015 saw a minimum yield of 1.68% and a maximum yield of
2.5%. 2013 hit nearby lows of 1.66%, but reached its widest level at 3.04% over the year,
ranging a total of 138 bps. This summarizes a more responsive bond market in 2013, while VIX
readings point to a more responsive stock market in 2015. In observing both the VIX and the 10year’s response to market shocks over each of these years, I will interpret this difference in
responsiveness as it affects the way investors react to market-shocks.
I will differentiate between fear and rationality using these gauges. An analysis of the
VIX reading preceding each event and its relative change following will expose the “magnitude”
of fear, as outlined in Becker and Rubinstein (2011). An event with legitimate consequences for
financial security fundamentals will observe lasting effects on the 10yr yields (Lange, Sack, &
Whitesell 2003; Fleming & Remolona 1999).

3. Domestic Economic News & Market Reaction
First, I will observe the market’s reaction to domestic economic data releases and FOMC
announcements. The Federal Reserve Open Market Committee (FOMC) is the governing body
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tasked with establishing U.S. monetary policy that aims to achieve the dual mandate of stable
inflation and low unemployment. The release of data related to the Fed’s dual mandate can
significantly disrupt markets through a change in expectations of FOMC action (Bernanke &
Kuttner 2005; Lange et al 2003).
A 2005 study by previous Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke concludes that
unanticipated changes in the federal funds rate target are significant in their correlation to an
immediate stock market reaction (Bernanke & Kuttner 2005). Using federal funds futures
contracts to distinguish the level of expectation of a rate change by investors, the Kuttner and
Bernanke are able to regress the coefficient for expected rate changes and the variable for
unexpected rate changes on the corresponding stock market return. They find that an
unanticipated cut of 25 bps is associated with a 1% increase in broad stock indexes. Their study
focuses on the difference in market reaction once the Federal Reserve increased transparency and
began signaling a rate change in advance of any action, beginning in 1994.
Since 2005, the transparency provided by the FOMC has significantly increased (Ihrig et
al 2015). The market typically has any federal funds target changes priced-in weeks ahead of the
announcement, leaving the immediate reactions to FOMC action limited (Bernanke & Kuttner
2005). Therefore, instead of focusing on FOMC action, I will focus on domestic releases that
alter expectations of future action, as well as broader economic data releases that have potential
to alter the projected course of Fed action.

3.1. Domestic Economic News & Market Reaction: 2013
In the wake of the 2008-2009 financial crisis the Federal Reserve engaged in an
expansionary monetary policy that brought the federal funds target to extremely low levels.
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Money was pumped into the economy through multiple rounds of quantitative easing to ensure a
liquid marketplace and a greater accessibility to credit for investors and consumers (Ihrig,
Meade, & Weinbach 2015). Monetary policy stimulus is consistently very supportive of the
stock market, as low yielding fixed-income securities leads yield-seeking investors to riskier
equities (Thorbecke 1997). On 6/19/13, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke warned of a tapering of
stimulus, and an eventual end to the stimulus that had inflated equity values since the crisis. The
VIX and 10-year yield reaction following his announcement are pictured below:
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Each gauge experiences an initial surge in reaction to the Thursday news, and the VIX continues
climbing through Monday, where it hits 2013 highs. The yield on the 10-year Treasury
experiences an initial increase of 13 basis points, gaining a total of 32 basis points through the
weekend as investors drive down Treasury prices due to the change in expectations of interest
rates.

3.2. Domestic Economic News & Market Reaction: 2015
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The rate discussion became even more prominent in 2015. The FOMC began tapering

their purchases of government securities, and was searching for the right time to begin increasing
the federal funds target rate. The Fed had communicated confidence in a rate hike by year-end,
but a plunge in commodity prices and global uncertainty weighed on their dual mandate of stable
inflation and low unemployment. Consequentially, any data-release regarding the state of the
economy was read as indicative of the Fed’s behavior (Bernanke & Kuttner 2005).
The Nonfarm Payroll report released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) each month
summarizes the amount of jobs added to the economy. Positive readings –recently in the ballpark
of 150,000+ new jobs— signal a healthy job market. Analysts polled by Bloomberg, Reuters,
and other market-based news sources form an aggregated prediction, widely referenced as the
market’s consensus expectation (Campbell & Sharpe 2009). The January Nonfarm Payroll report
released on February 6th, 2015 came in above expectations of 230,000 at 257,000, and included
large upward revisions to November and December numbers. Due to the importance of low
unemployment to the Federal Reserve’s main objectives, the report is considered indicative of
future FOMC action (Bernanke & Kuttner 2005)—in this case, indicating a reduced timeline to
rate-hike. Following the release, the stock market experienced a minor increase in volatility with
intraday highs of 18.74, over prior day’s highs of 17.38. The pre-event downward trend of VIX
indicates the market’s surprise, and the subsequent daily increase in volatility indicates
uncertainty in processing the news. Pictured with the VIX below, the 10-year saw a much
sharper decline in value with yields widening out 12 basis points:
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A swing of 12 bps is substantial, and indicative of a change in investor expectations of interest
rates. Here, the positive data released by the BLS illustrates a healthy economy, which is
supportive of a near-term rate hike (Bernanke & Kuttner 2005).
The FOMC increased their target rate from 0-25 basis points to 25-50 basis points at the
December 15, 2015 meeting. After 11 months of signaling an increase before year-end, investors
had largely priced-in the hike. Pictured below is the market’s reaction:
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Because of the FOMC’s transparency (Ihrig et al 2015), investors had begun began speculating
before the weekend, four days prior to the 12/15/15 rate hike. Consistent with rational behavior
in markets prior to a scheduled event (Lange et al 2003), VIX stays above 25 in the two prior
trading days, before beginning its decline at the announcement.

3.3. Domestic Economic News & Market Reaction: Conclusion
This section has served to define rational market behavior. Investors alter their
expectations of FOMC action and confidence in equities based on economic data releases (Lange
et al 2003; Bernanke & Kuttner 2005; Fleming & Remolona 1999). Positive releases signal a
tightening of monetary policy, encouraging an exit from treasuries—sending yields higher, and
prices lower- and an increase in equity volatility as investors reposition themselves, observed as
an increase in VIX (Lange et al 2003). FOMC announcements provoke volatility in trading as
the announcement approaches, until returning to normal levels at the time of the release (Lange
et al 2003; Fleming & Remolona 1999; Bernanke & Kuttner 2005). I observe a sharper increase
in volatility in 2013 following the surprise FOMC announcements, relative to each year’s
respective annual median. 2015, however, experienced higher overall levels of volatility,
indicating a more risk-averse investing environment. This discussion is beneficial to my thesis in
providing a framework for rational behavior in response to domestic shocks. Consistent with
rational market behavior (Wang 1993), my observations provide a relevant framework for
comparison to the market behavior in the wake of a terror event.
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4. Foreign Economic News & Market Reaction
The Federal Reserve’s policy of extreme transparency makes the actions of other major
central banks appear brash by comparison. This creates the potential for foreign central bank
behavior to rattle domestic financial markets, and has become increasingly relevant as global
markets become further interdependent. 2013 and 2015 diverge in treatment of foreign monetary
policy announcements as investors adjust to the FOMC’s emphasis on global economic health in
the 2015 rate hike decision (Federal Reserve Board 2015).
In the wake of the financial crisis, the United States was the first major economy to take
extreme easing measures, significantly expanding the balance sheet and lowering the federal
funds target to near zero levels (Mishkin 2010). The European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of
Japan (BOJ), and the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) lagged the Fed in their stimulus, leaving
central bank policy incongruent (Pill 2009). This divergence created a situation in which the
United States became the first major economy to need to return to normalcy, strengthening the
USD against all foreign currencies and thereby having extensive implications for foreign
investment and international trade. In 2013, the Federal Reserve focused on domestic indicators
of economic health in its decision to slow stimulus. Positive domestic data was supplemented in
2015 by global financial market uncertainty as the Fed considered the risks of policy divergence,
evoking severe volatility in response to any central bank announcements (Federal Reserve Board
2015).
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4.1. Foreign Economic News & Market Reaction: 2013
The ECB’s monetary policy was much less aggressive than the Federal Reserve in

response to the financial crisis (Pill 2009). From July-October 2008, the ECB raised the main
refinancing rate as opposed to lowering it. The central bank began cutting rates in October 2008,
but did not announce near-zero levels until 2013, on November 7th, ahead of the BLS Nonfarm
Payroll release on November 8th (European Central Bank 2013). The market reaction was muted,
pictured below:
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The announcement of near-zero rates on 11/07/13 appears to have spiked the VIX to its monthly
high, but it is important to note the proximity of the jobs report on 11/08/13.
It is typical of rational market behavior for speculators to employ volatile trading tactics
while anticipating a major economic report (Lange et al 2003; Bernanke & Kuttner 2005). In this
instance, yields on the 10-year decline with the ECB news, as European stimulus weighs on
inflation (because an increase in the European money supply strengthens the dollar against the
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euro), but increased by 14 basis points on the positive employment data released Friday. The
swift recovery in yields signals the insignificance of the ECB announcement to the market, and is
suggestive of a stronger correlation between 11/07 behavior and 11/08 Nonfarm Payrolls data.

4.2. Foreign Economic News & Market Reaction: 2015
Due to consistent improvements to the domestic economy, 2015 saw a shift in the Federal
Reserve’s focus from domestic economic data releases to monetary policy changes abroad. A
steep decline in commodity prices put deflationary pressures on the USD, and coupled with
monetary easing abroad, was threatening the Federal Reserve’s goal of 2% inflation (Federal
Reserve Board 2015).
In particular, the market had been focusing on the slowing growth in the Chinese
economy. A significant portion of global demand comes from Chinese consumers (Morrison
2013) ensuring that a slowdown in growth is felt across nations. For the first half of 2015,
Chinese financial markets and economic data releases dominated market headlines (Federal
Reserve Board of St. Louis 2015). Then, on August 11th, the PBOC shocked financial markets by
announcing a devaluation of their currency, the Yuan (People’s Bank of China 2015). This
announcement left investors uneasy, but did not send markets into a spiral until HSBC released
the Caixin China PMI Manufacturing numbers on August 21st.
The PMI (Purchasing Managers’ Index) measures the performance of the manufacturing
sector. A reading above 50 indicates an expansion of the manufacturing sector, a reading below
50 signals a contraction, and a reading of 50 indicates no change (Caixin Markit 2015). The
August 21st numbers were expected to drop 0.1 to 47.7 from a prior month’s reading of 47.8.
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Instead, at 47.1, the index had hit 77-month lows. An initial 47.5% surge in VIX from 8/20/15
highs indicates the importance of China’s economic standpoint to American investors, and was
reaffirmed after the weekend with 8/24/15 highs of 53.29 (marking the highest VIX reading
since 2009). Investors who did not participate in the initial spike in VIX on the 21st processed the
news over the weekend and entered the marketplace ready to act on the negative data, driving
volatility levels beyond 2009 highs, bolded below:
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The surge in the investor fear gauge of 25 points (that is, an increase in uncertainty of the
direction of the market of 25%) signifies how relevant the global uncertainty story has become in
recent years (Lange et al 2003; Durand et al 2011). The poor reading implies a need for further
Chinese monetary easing, triggering a fear in the stability of global markets and in a strong US
dollar’s implications for domestic inflation targets (Kaminsky & Lewis 1996), while threatening
the recovery of the global economy.
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4.3. Foreign Economic News & Market Reaction: Conclusion
Based on the above examples, there was a clear and increasing trend of importance in the

anticipation of monetary policy actions abroad to the stock market’s reaction domestically from
2013 to 2015. With commodity prices already muting domestic inflation levels, the relative
increase in USD spending power against its peers created an additional obstacle in the Fed’s
fulfillment of its 2% inflation target (Kaminsky & Lewis 1996). The increased relevance of
foreign monetary policy to domestic market behavior is observed in the comparison between
VIX reactivity across the foreign events discussed in 2013 and 2015. This provides further
insight into the divergence in behavior across each year, as well as an example of rational
investor decision making in the face of a shock.

5. Terror Strikes & Market Reaction
Terrorism is unique in its effect on financial markets. While the likelihood of being
directly affected by terrorism is negligible, it reserves the power to alter the behavior of entire
populations by instilling a lasting fear of unlikely dangers (Becker & Rubinstein 2011), evoking
an irrational necessity for average investors to exit all risky positions. Becker and Rubinstein
consider the timeline of the impacts of terrorism on human behavior, acknowledging the
influence of fear on beliefs and decision-making, “so that subjective and objective beliefs can
diverge with concomitant effects on individual decisions” before individuals learn to control
their emotions to align with their long-run interests (Becker & Rubinstein 2011, p. 3). Of the
accounts examined in this paper, September 11, 2001 elicited the most extreme response from
financial markets to terrorism. Since 2001, the threat of terrorism on the western world has
exponentially increased, but investor reactions have diminished (START 2013). Consistent with
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Becker and Rubinstein (2011), investors gained initial experience with 9-11, and have since
learned to adequately control their fear-driven responses to terror.

5.1. Terror Strikes & Market Reaction: 9/11/2001
For the broader American population, 9-11 introduced a newfound feeling of danger, a
more cautious perspective on safety and the power of evil. This broad-based fear erupted through
American financial markets as soon as stock markets reopened on September 17th, seen as an
initial 11-point surge in VIX and decline of 20 basis points in the 10-year Treasury yields when
Over-the-Counter (OTC) securities resumed trading on September 13th:
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For a much smaller population, like the commodities trader mentioned previously, it meant an
opportunity to profit from common investor fear as it drove fundamentally strong equities to new
lows, and inflated the price of safe-haven assets (De Long et al 1990). This fight between fear
and greed kept volatility high above pre-event levels for multiple weeks.
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According to efficient market theory, investors act rationally while responding to an

economic event that alters their expectations of the fundamental value of a security (Wang
1993). Following 9-11, many economists studied the immediate effects on the value of airline,
financial, and insurance equities (Chen et al 2008; Obi 2007). Airline stocks fell off significantly
after the event, as investor’s predicted a new fear of flight and the consequential decrease in
demand for major airlines (Drakos 2004; Carter & Simkins 2002). Insurance companies were hit
with massive payout claims, and the financial sector was expected to face reduced liquidity as
investors withdrew assets (Chen et al 2008; Carter & Simkins 2002). Obi (2007) observes
“significant negative excess returns…in the airlines and financial services sectors due to the
incident,” followed by a reversal of excess returns, indicative of an overreaction by the markets.
Because the reaction cannot be attributed to a rational belief in the fundamental valuation
of the equity market, I will now argue that expectations of fundamental values across fixed
income markets should not rationally been altered by the attack. The immediate decline in in 10year yields by 20 basis points exposes clear excitement in the bond market, despite the Federal
Reserve remaining unchanged in its policy. In fact, the immediate response from the Federal
Reserve came as a statement issued on the morning of 9/11, stating very simply, “The Federal
Reserve system is open and operating. The discount window is available to meet liquidity needs”
(Federal Reserve Board 2001). This statement should have had two main effects. First, all else
equal, the market should have been reassured by the Fed’s pledge of consistency, which does not
necessarily warrant a change in yields. Second, the Fed plainly stated that they would support
financial intermediaries by providing needed liquidity, which should have dismissed fears of a
bank-run and instilled confidence in financial equity shareholders (Gorton & Metrick 2013).
Instead of stability on both fronts, a fear-driven retreat from bank stocks tore through markets,
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leaving financial intermediaries’ share values to plummet and the price of the 10-year Treasury
to skyrocket (Carter & Simkins 2002). In the wake of the terror, uncertainty in market stability
drove investors away from equities and into Treasuries, the least risky alternative
(Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen 2012). This decrease in risk tolerance was observed by Obi
(2007) who suggests that 9-11 instilled such uncertainty in financial markets that it permanently
altered investor risk appetite.
I return now to Rubinstein and Becker’s (2011) definition of fear, and evaluate the
magnitude with which subjective beliefs about danger have hindered objective risk assessment. I
want to distinguish between a fear of uncertain future value and a speculation that values are
approaching a near-term change, the former indicative of irrational fear, and the latter of rational
fear. Investor speculation surrounded the January 2015 Nonfarm Payrolls, as well as China’s
August 2015 PMI reading. Market speculation, or economic reasoning based on beliefs in future
stream of endowments (Leoni 2009), requires a rational decision-making process—an ability to
connect one catalyst event to a logical outcome, and react based on the severity of the potential
outcome (Kausik & Koo 2001). While an overreaction to airline stocks is suggestive of this
process, a volatile reaction across all sectors indicates an irrational investor fear, evident in the
wake of 9-11 by the cross-sector panic selling. The fall-off in yields surrounding the terror can
be attributed to a lasting decline in risk tolerance (Obi 2007).

5.2. Terror Strikes & Market Reaction: Boston Marathon
The attack at the April 2013 Boston Marathon was the first terrorist bombing on United
States ground since September 2001. Three victims were killed by the blast, while several
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hundred were injured (Brinkley 2013). 4/13/13 intraday VIX highs reached just 13.12, making
the 4/15 reading of 17.27 a 31.6% surge in volatility:
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While a reading of 17.27 is below the accepted “normal” reading of 20, its premium over the
annual average signals a meaningful increase in investor fear (Durand et al 2011).
Returning to the Wang (1993) theory of efficient markets, investors behave rationally by
reacting to an economic event that alters their expectations of fundamental valuations. As
mentioned in the prior discussion of the 9-11 attacks and airline stocks, a terror threat does not
merit a response in equities unless a direct path of influence can be interpreted (Litzenberger &
Tuttle 1972; Fleming & Remolona 1999). Insufficient research has been published on the effects
of Boston Marathon attack on stock market sectors, so I will be using data on the prices of the
SPDR sector ETFs (Exchange Traded Funds) that underlie the S&P 500 index to draw
conclusions about the nature of the stock market’s reaction across sectors (Hasbrouck 2003).
There are eleven broad-based sectors represented by the S&P 500: Consumer Discretionary
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(XLY), Energy (XLE), Health Care (XLV), Materials (XLB), Utilities (XLU), Consumer Staples
(XLP), Financials (XLF), Industrials (XLI), and Technology (XLK).

ETF Response Across Sector - Month of April
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Observable through the chart above, the range in value in every underlying sector of the
S&P 500 was above the monthly average. Further, 10 of the 11 sectors saw their largest monthly
spreads the day of the attack. Thus, the response on 4/15/13 was not a change in investor
expectations of fundamental valuation—investors were not solely targeting stock sectors with
direct relationships to Boston’s economy.
As I have established the similarities between investor behavior following 9-11 and the
market’s reaction to the April 2013 attack, I will highlight the differences that suggest a
declining fear of terrorism due to increased exposure (Becker & Rubinstein 2011). Defining fear
as the magnitude with which a subjective belief about danger hinders objective risk assessment
(Becker & Rubinstein 2011), following the attack, it appears that investors are able to alter their
response. Unlike the September 11th reaction, VIX returns to annual averages within 10 days of
the bombing. Similarly, after an initial 10-year tightening of 3 basis points, investors corrected
their reaction in the fixed-income market by allowing yields to return to pre-event levels the
following day. Initially, irrational panic selling caused the spike in volatility and the decline in
10-year Treasury yields (De Long et al 1990). Becker and Rubinstein (2011) observe the impact
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of prior experience with terror on fear-driven market behavior, and conclude that previous
experiences allow individuals to assess risk more objectively. Investors’ swift return to rational
decision-making following the Boston Marathon attack, evident in surrounding VIX and 10-year
yields, is supportive of this phenomenon.
A possible alternative explanation is 2013’s low volatility environment, implying a sense
of bullishness in market participants. Mun, Fleak, and Morgan (2010) found that volatility prior
to a negative shock adversely affects the market’s speed of adjustment. This suggests that the
swift correction back to normalcy (or settlement to a new normal following the event) observed
post-4/15 might be the result of a less volatile investor base. While this theory appears logical, I
provide the counterexample in my examination of the 2015 Paris attacks below, as the attacks on
11/13/15 were met by a similar response timeline despite higher pre-event volatility.

5.3. Terror Strikes & Market Reaction: Paris Attacks
The coordinated terror strikes in Paris, France of November 2015 marked the deadliest
terror attack in Europe since the 2004 Madrid bombings (Brisard 2015). VIX spiked 11.72%
day-over-day following the news, ranging 26.93% higher than median 2015 highs of 16.28:
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Volatility returned to pre-event levels by 11/19/15. 10-year yields continued to fall through the
end of the month, signaling a lasting effect felt by bond-markets (Krishnamurthy & VissingJorgensen 2012; Fleming & Remolona 1999).
A rational reaction to a market event is triggered when expectations of fundamental
valuations have been reasonably altered (Wang 1993). The November 2015 Paris attacks,
consistent with the previous examples, did not cause any fundamental changes in equity
valuations across sectors of the S&P 500. Due to insufficient research published surrounding the
attacks, I observe the SPDR sector ETFs, and their intraday ranges in values. While every sector
experiences a sell-off, only Consumer Discretionary (XLY), Materials (XLB), and Technology
(XLK) sectors saw their maximum spread the day of the attack. The volatility range across each
remaining sector was not far from their monthly averages. Paired with disappointing retail and
commodities data releases the day of the attack (United States Census Bureau 2015), this
behavior is suggestive of a primary sell-off in those three sectors based on unrelated fundamental
changes (Kausik & Koo 2001), spreading throughout other sectors with the Paris attacks bringing
geopolitical concerns to the forefront. The initial volatility spike is consistent with the market
behavior following both the Boston Marathon attacks and 9-11. The indiscriminate sell-off
emphasizes the degree of panic selling (Durand et al 1990; Kausik & Koo 2001; Mun et al 2010)
as investors act in fear of the uncertainty that a terror threat of this magnitude evokes.
Intraday VIX highs dipped down to 18.26 nine days after the attack, just 0.24 shy of the
18.5 reading on 11/12/15. Following the 2013 attack on the Boston Marathon, intraday VIX
highs returned to pre-event levels in ten days. In response to the attack on September 11th, it took
intraday VIX highs seventeen days to reach 9/10/01 levels. It is important to note the declining
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trend in return times, as the timeline of a return to normal levels following a spike indicates a
greater degree of lasting uncertainty (Dueker 1997).
The yield on 10-year Treasuries tightened by 4 basis points. Again, a tightening in fixed
income markets following the event is consistent with both the April 2013 Boston attack and 911. The recovery time, however, varies across all three events. This could be due to a number of
different outside variables. Permanent decreases in risk tolerance were observed across U.S.
financial markets post-September 11th (Obi 2007). Instead of returning to previous levels, 10year yields settled to a new normal, reflective of the increase in demand for safe-haven assets
(Litzenberger & Tuttle 1972). Similarities in stock market volatility following the 2013 Boston
Marathon and the 2015 Paris attacks might lead to the assumption that fixed income markets
would also be consistent. Comparing November 2015’s continual decline in 10-year yields to
Boston Marathon’s rapid return to normalcy suggests either that, similar to 9-11, the Paris attack
caused an increase in risk premium, or that an outside force was influencing fixed income
markets surrounding one of the two events.
Returning to broad comparisons, 2015 experienced more financial market volatility than
2013. The Federal Reserve was signaling a rate hike before year-end, causing unease across both
equity and fixed income markets. Lange et al (2003) examine the effects of anticipation of
monetary policy change on financial markets, and observe that an expectation of a tightening in
monetary policy is met by an increase in Treasury yields. The sustained decline in yields
following the November 2015 Paris attacks does not signal the market’s anticipation of the Fed’s
promised 2015 rate-hike, but is more suggestive of speculation that the Fed would not take rate
action at the December meeting. Following the September 2015 FOMC meeting, a statement was
issued that newly incorporated concerns of global instability weighing on the ability for a near-
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term rate hike (Federal Reserve Board 2015). The extended decline in November 2015 yields
following the Paris attacks suggests the market’s belief that monetary policy would remain
unchanged in the near-term, confirmed by a reversal of the downward trend following Janet
Yellen’s 12/03/15 announcement affirming plans to raise the federal funds rate target at the
December meeting (Federal Reserve Board 2015).

5.4. Terror Strikes & Market Reaction: Conclusion
The threat of terror on North American or European soil consistently causes a surge in
equity volatility, measured in VIX, as outlined in the above examples. Further, this surge in
volatility is not attributed to a belief in fundamental equity valuations changing, as some reports
surrounding 9-11 claim (Carter & Simkins 2002; Drakos 2004). Lacking a rational link to an
expected change in fundamental value, the amount of time that VIX remains above pre-event
levels is suggestive of the magnitude of fear in the market. The yield on the 10-year Treasury
declines in each examined instance of terrorism, but the time period of the decline differs across
each event. Because 9-11 serves as the first large-scale instance of terrorism in recent decades,
market participants collectively decrease their risk tolerance and yields remain low, indicative of
a risk-averse market (Litzenberger & Tuttle 1972). From 2001-2015, the frequency of terror
attacks increases exponentially (START 2013), and the increased exposure allows investors to
mute their reactions to terror shocks (Becker & Rubinstein 2011). Boston’s April 2013 attack
observes a one-day displacement of Treasury yields, consistent with this phenomenon. Paris’
November 2015 attack, by contrast, contributes to a steady decline in yields through the end of
the month. This can be attributed to the impending December FOMC Meeting, in which market
behavior, prior to the Paris attack’s reminder of global uncertainty, was consistent with an

Roland

30

anticipation of a Federal Reserve interest rate hike (Lange et al 2003). The terrorism’s reminder
of global uncertainty caused a reversal of expectations in fixed-income markets, explaining the
sustained decline in yields.
Again, I will return to the Becker and Rubinstein (2011) definition of fear as the
magnitude with which a subjective belief about danger is able to hinder objective risk
assessment. Surges in VIX illustrate irrational market behavior when no evidence exists of a
change in expectations of fundamental values (De Long et al 1990). Consistent across each
observed instance of terror, the fear of uncertainty in domestic stock value spikes volatility
across equity sectors, hindering investors’ ability to objectively assess the risk that a single-name
equity is exposed to. No change in the 10-year Treasury yield can be indicative of an
overreaction in equities. Lasting changes in the 10-year Treasury yield indicate a change in
expectations of monetary policy or a shift in demand for safe-haven assets as substitutes to
riskier asset-classes (Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen 2012). While inconsistent, each terror
event’s reaction in the 10-year Treasury yield is justifiably attributed to one of the three rational
outcomes, allowing my inference that 10-year Treasury yields respond rationally to terrorism.

6. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to distinguish between rational market reactions to market
shocks and irrational fear-driven behavior, with particular emphasis on the power of terrorism in
provoking the latter (Becker & Rubinstein 2011). I observe market behavior in the wake of
economic data released relative to the FOMC’s dual mandate, and any surprise announcements
in monetary policy, and find an inflation in VIX readings before scheduled FOMC
announcements, remaining active after the announcement if the substance of the release was
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unanticipated (Bernanke & Kuttner 2005). I expand my observation to foreign monetary policy
action to incorporate impact of less transparent central bank behavior (relative to extremely high
transparency from the Federal Reserve) on domestic asset-values and volatility (Lange et al
2003; Thorbecke 1997) and find that markets behave rationally, as investors speculate about the
implications for domestic monetary policy and investment demand.
Rational market behavior, outlined by efficient market theory, involves a shift in security
value due to a change in expectations of economic fundamentals (Wang 1993). Yields on
government bonds (and at their inverse: prices) change in the short-term based on the market’s
expectation of monetary policy and demand for US investment, and observe lasting shifts when
policy change occurs and/or long-term demand is altered (Lange et al 2003; Krishnamurthy &
Vissing-Jorgensen 2012). Therefore, my choice to observe fixed-income markets surrounding
data releases and policy announcements for both foreign and domestic central banks is optimal,
and provides an example of rational responses in yields following a fundamental change (Lange
et al 2003).
In my observations of market behavior surrounding terrorism, I illustrate large surges in
VIX that are suggestive of fear-driven panic selling (Durand et al 2011). My observation of
irrational market participation as a fear-based response to terrorism is consistent with the effect
of noise traders discussed by De Long et al (1990), Brown (1999), and Campbell and Kyle
(1993). De Long et al (1990) describe noise traders as those investors who, acting on erroneous
beliefs, cause prices to diverge from fundamental values, regardless of the presence of
fundamental risk. The terror-triggered response of fear invites this type of irrational agent to the
marketplace, observed as post-event volatility above.
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I observe rational moves in 10-year Treasury yields that respond to the terror event only

if expectations of investment demand are altered or if the event might effect the achievement of
the Fed’s dual mandate. Altered expectations of investor demand might be a response to
uncertainty in equity markets causing a flight to quality (Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen
2012), particularly when equity valuations have diverged from fundamentals (De Long et al
1990). Such a response was observed following the attack on 9-11, as a decrease in risk appetite
resulted in an increase in demand for safe-haven assets (Obi 2007). The Boston Marathon attack
prompted a slight tightening in 10-year yields the day of the attack, but corrected back to preevent levels by the next day’s close, which is suggestive of the market discount of event as
insignificant to fundamental values (Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen 2012). The November
2015 Paris attacks saw an initial decrease in yields of 4 basis points, but continued a steady
decline through the end of the month. The attack was concurrent with a discussion on the Fed’s
likelihood of increasing their target rate at their December meeting. After the FOMC cited the
stability of global markets as an additional consideration before tightening policy (Federal
Reserve Board 2015), expectations for a December hike dropped, causing investors to prop up
the value of Treasuries (Lange et al 2003).
I observe a decline in the duration of VIX response to terror over time as investors
become increasingly exposed, consistent with previous studies on responsiveness and exposure
(Becker & Rubinstein 2011). Observing this theory in aggregate with De Long et al (1990) and
statistics from the Global Terrorism Database (START 2013), an increased exposure to terror
had allowed for a decline in noise trading surrounding attacks –the subject of terrorism provoked
declining magnitudes of fear, or responsiveness to “noise”, as the volume of attacks increased.
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A few potential conflicts should be addressed before concluding. First, economists have

observed a correlation between the number of deaths in a terror event and the magnitude of the
reaction by financial markets (Eldor & Melnick 2004). The attacks on 9-11 observed more
fatalities than did the Paris and Boston attacks, which may affect my conclusion. The effect on
investor fear, however, should have been unaffected. Assuming that fear alters risk tolerance
(Lerner et al 2003), using the Becker and Rubinstein (2011) definition of fear, and defining
magnitude as the average percentage change in VIX day-over-day, Boston and Paris saw a
similar magnitude, regardless of large differences in fatalities.
Second, Paris and Boston do not have the same status as a financial market capital as
New York City does, potentially affecting the response in markets to 9-11. Again, I counter with
the consistency in the range of magnitude of fear in the market’s initial reaction to each event.
Additionally, within the same cultural range, Eldor and Melnick (2004) found a negligible effect
of the location of terrorism in its response from financial markets.
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